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Abstract
Lanchester (1916) modeled combat situations between two opponents, where
mutual attrition occurs continuously in time, by a pair of simple ordinary (lin-
ear) differential equations. The aim of the present paper is to extend the model
to a conflict consisting of three parties. In particular, Lanchester’s main result,
i.e. his square law, is adapted to a triple fight. However, here a central factor
– besides the initial strengths of the forces – determining the long run outcome
is the allocation of each opponent’s efforts between the other two parties. De-
pending on initial strengths, (the) solution paths are calculated and visualized
in appropriate phase portraits. We are able identify regions in the state space
where, independent of the force allocation of the opponents, always the same
combatant wins, regions, where a combatant can win if its force allocation is
wisely chosen, and regions where a combatant cannot win itself but determine
the winner by its forces allocation. As such, the present model can be seen as a
forerunner of a dynamic game between three opponents.
Keywords: system dynamics, Lanchester model, Square Law, three
combatants
1. Introduction
Lanchester (1916) applied a pair of linear ordinary differential equations to
understand the dynamics of a battle between two opponents. He was inspired by
the attrition and exhaustion of fighters in air combats in World War I. Since then
many papers have been published on that and related issues, see, e.g. Morse
and Kimball (1951); see also Washburn and Kress (2009); Kress (2012). It is
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surprising, however, that while Lanchester attrition duels are prevalent in the
literature, there are no such models for combat situations involving three sides.
The aim of this paper is to extend Lanchester theory to the case of three-way
battle.
In the classic Lanchester model two opponents fight each other. Their sizes
are considered as state variables. The decrease of their forces over time depends
on the size of the forces and their per capita effectiveness measured by their
respective attrition rates. There are two main types of Lanchester models cor-
responding to direct and area fire. The direct fire model results in a quadratic
equation (conserved quantity) that is manifested in the Square Law. The area
fire model induces a linear state equation and, accordingly, is governed by the
Linear Law. Although there exist stochastic versions of the models (e.g., Kress
and Talmor (1999)) the commonly used models are deterministic. Deitchman
(1962) combined the two types of Lanchester models and defined the “Guerrilla
Warfare” model where one side (the guerrillas) utilize direct fire, while the other
side (regular forces) use area fire.
Lanchester models are purely attritional and ignore the crucial role of sit-
uational awareness and intelligence. Attempts to generalize Lanchester theory
by incorporating the effect of information are reported in Kress and Szechtman
(2009); Kaplan et al. (2010).
The aim of the present paper is to extend the analysis of the classic Lanch-
ester model of direct fire to a three-sided battle. The analysis is motivated by
recent events in Syria, where at least three armed forces – Syrian government,
Syrian opposition and the Islamic State – fight each other to gain control on
land, people and national assets. In contrast to a one-on-one engagement, ad-
ditional parameters are needed to indicate how each side’s firepower should be
allocated between its two opponents. Compare also the literature on optimal
fire distribution where one of the two opponents consists of two heterogeneous
forces, see e.g. Taylor (1974); Lin and MacKay (2014). We assume that each
party commits to allocate a fixed percentage of its efforts toward each opponent
throughout the conflict, e.g., one-third directed against enemy 1 and two-thirds
against enemy 2. We will show how the initial force-size of the three opponents
together with the attrition rates and the fire-allocation tactics determine the
winner of the battle. More complicated, dynamically adjusting strategies are
possible in principle, but the fixed proportions problem is interesting in and of
itself.
We use eigenvalue analysis to identify surfaces separating regions of initial
states that differ in the way the conflict is played out. By restricting the state
space to the unit simplex we obtain an illustrative description of the solution
paths. Moreover, we are able to identify in that simplex, for each side, its
winning regions – initial conditions that guarantee its win.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
characterize the solution. In Section 3 we discuss the numerical solution of the
problem. Section 4 concludes.
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2. Lanchester model with three combatants
We formulate a two-stage Lanchester model in Section 2.1, and introduce
some important concepts in Section 2.2. We recapitulate the important prop-
erties of the Lanchester model with two sides in Section 2.3, and derive the
corresponding properties for the model with three sides in Section 2.4.
2.1. Two-Stage Model
We consider a situation where each force among three is engaged in combat
against the other two (henceforth called also sides or combatant). The strength
of each of the forces at time t is denoted as Ij(t), j = 0, 1, 2. In fact the
strength of the forces Ij , j = 0, 1, 2 are normalized by the initial total size
N =
∑2
j=0 Ij(0) and hence denote the relative strengths. Due to the linearity
of the ODEs the total strength is given by the multiplication with N . The battle
comprises two stages. In the first stage of the battle each side can split its forces
between the two opponents. The fraction of the force of side j that is allocated
to engage side i is denoted by the parameter yij , i, j = 0, 1, 2. The parameters
ai,j denote the attrition rates when j engages i with i, j = 0, 1, 2.
If one of the three forces is annihilated, the two remaining sides continue in
a Square Law battle. Formally,
İ0(t) = −a01y01I1(t)− a02y02I2(t), t ∈ [0, τ1〉 (1a)
İ1(t) = −a10y10I0(t)− a12y12I2(t), t ∈ [0, τ1〉 (1b)
İ2(t) = −a20y20I0(t)− a21y21I1(t), t ∈ [0, τ1〉 (1c)
where τ1 is the time when the first force among the three is annihilated. The
initial sizes of the forces are given by
Ij(0) = I
0
j ≥ 0, j = 0, 1, 2, and
2∑
j=0
I0j = 1. (1d)
If the forces of the remaining sides k, l with k 6= l are strictly positive at τ1,
then at the second stage
İk(t) = −aklIl(t), t ∈ [τ1, τ2〉 (1e)
İl(t) = −alkIk(t), t ∈ [τ1, τ2〉 (1f)
İj(t) = 0, j = 3− (k + l), t ∈ [τ1, τ2〉 (1g)
where τ2 is the time when the second stage ends where at least one of the two
remaining sides from stage one is annihilated too.
The coefficients in the first stage satisfy
0 ≤ yij ≤ 1,
∑
i 6=j
yij = 1, aij > 0, i, j = 0, 1, 2, i 6= j, (1h)
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Table 1: All possible cases for the first and the second extinction time.
Cases
First and second extinction time
τ1 τ2
no annihilation in finite time τ1 = τ2 =∞
exactly one annihilation
in finite time τ1 < τ2 =∞
two forces are annihilated
at the same time τ1 = τ2 <∞




[τ1, τ2] τ2 <∞
[τ1,∞) τ2 =∞.
The restriction as in the first stage Eq. (1d) is the normalization mentioned
before that allows us to consider the unit tetrahedron as phase space with the
initial states (force sizes) lying in the unit 2-simplex, subsequently denoted as
∆.
For the second stage we assume that the combat attrition rates remain the
same as in the first stage.
2.2. Extinction times and curves
The next sections address the problem of classifying possible scenarios for
the solutions of Eq. (1). Specifically we are interested in determining the first
and second extinction times τ1 and τ2 and if there exists an opponent Ik(·) who
wins in the sense that Ik(τ2) > 0. Thus, we give the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Extinction times, survivors, winner and stages). Let I(·) =
(I0(·), I1(·), I2(·))> be the solution of Eqs. (1a) to (1d). The time τ1 such that
one of the combatants becomes zero is called the first extinction time. If none
of the combatants becomes zero τ1 = ∞. A combatant k with Ik(τ1) > 0 is
called a survivor. The time τ2 when one of the survivors becomes zero is called
the second extinction time. If none of the survivors becomes zero τ2 = ∞. If
Ij(τ2) > 0 for some j the combatant j is called the winner of model (1).
The solution I(·) on the interval [0, τ1〉 will be called the solution of the first
stage and on the interval (τ1, τ2〉 the solution will be called the solution of the
second stage.
In Grass et al. (2016) it is proved that this definition is well defined.
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Subsequently we identify six different areas in the initial state space (∆) with
different combinations of survivors and winners. These areas are separated by
two types of curves. Before we give a formal definition of these curves we give
an informal description of two qualitatively different situations.
Remark 1 (Heuristic explanation of total extinction). Let us assume that for
some initial values combatant 0 wins (phase two). Changing the initial states we
assume that combatant 1 wins. What happens in the transition between these
two cases? In both cases combatant 2 looses, i.e. the first extinction time is finite
(τ1 < ∞). What happens to the second extinction time τ2 in the transition?
The nearer we get to the transition point the longer both opponents remain
positive, i.e. τ2 increases. In the extreme case at the transition the second
extinction time becomes infinite (τ2 =∞). This can only happen if combatants
0 and 1 end up at the stable path of the second stage. Those initial points that
satisfy this condition will be called total extinction curve. See Fig. 1b.
Remark 2 (Heuristic explanation iso-extinction). Let us consider the situation
where the identity of one of the survivors, e.g. combatants 0 and 1, changes. In
that case combatant 2 is always the winner of the second stage, thus the second
and hence the first extinction times are finite. In the transition combatants 0
and 1 are annihilated at the same time. Thus the first and second extinction
time coincide (τ1 = τ2). Those initial points that satisfy this condition will be
called the iso-extinction curve. See Fig. 1a.
Definition 2. Let τ1 and τ2 be the first and second extinction times corre-







ω(1) := {I0 ∈ ∆ : τ1 = τ2 =∞} (2)
is called the total extinction curve of the first kind.
•
ω(2) := {I0 ∈ ∆ : τ1 <∞, τ2 =∞} (3)
is called the total extinction curve of the second kind.
•
γ := {I0 ∈ ∆ : τ1 <∞, τ1 = τ2} (4)
is called the iso-extinction curve.
In the next sections we characterize the solution properties of ODEs for
the two stages. We note that the Eqs. (1a) to (1c) and Eqs. (1e) to (1f) are
linear. Thus, solutions of these ODEs are fully characterized by the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of the corresponding Jacobian matrices. We start with the
well-known two-sided Lanchester model of the second stage.
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(a) Crossing the iso-extinction curve
(b) Crossing the total-extinction curve
Figure 1: The dashed-dotted lines denote the considered initial forces, and the dotted lines
show the corresponding forces at the first extinction time. In (a) the initial forces cross the
iso-extinction curve (red). At the crossing point the corresponding dotted line hit the I2 axis
and the survivor change, whereas the winner of the model remains the same. In (b) the initial
forces cross the total-extinction curve (red). At the crossing point the dotted lines cross the
stable eigenspace (dashed, red) of the second stage. The winner of the model change, since
the solution paths end at different axis. The subplots on the upper right side shows the details
near the crossings.
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2.3. Subproblem with two combatants
To ease the notation we omit the double indexing for the second stage and
set the indices k and l of Eqs. (1e) and (1f) to zero and one. Thus, subproblem
Eqs. (1e) and (1f) becomes
İ0(t) = −a1I1(t), t ∈ [0, τ〉 (5a)




j ≥ 0, j = 0, 1 (5c)
and the coefficients satisfying
ai > 0, i = 0, 1.
τ being the first time that one of the sides becomes zero.
Definition 3 (Extinction time and winner). Let (I0(·), I1(·)) be a solution of
Eq. (5). The time τ such that one of the combatants becomes zero is called the
extinction time. If none of the combatants becomes zero, then τ =∞. If τ <∞
and Ik(τ) > 0, then combatant k is called the winner of Eq. (5).

































v0,j = 1 and v0,j > 0, j = 1, 2. (8)
Proof. Eigenvalues and eigenvectors can be derived from the Jacobian Eq. (6),
and simple inspection shows Eq. (8).
Remark 3. The eigenvector v0 corresponding to the negative eigenvalue plays a
crucial role. In the second stage of the Lanchester model Eq. (1) three combina-
tions of the akl parameter values are possible. Subsequently we denote the corre-
sponding (stable) eigenvectors with the normalization Eq. (8) as v
(i)
0 , i = 0, 1, 2.
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The subsequent proposition uniquely characterizes the winner of the Lanch-
ester model Eq. (5).
Proposition 2. If I0(0) > 0 and I1(0) > 0, then combatant 0 or 1, respectively,
















Equations (9) and (10) are also called Lanchester Square Law. For the proof
we use the property that the stable path separates the phase space into invariant
regions.
















I0(t), t ≥ 0.














, t ≥ 0.
If the inequality is strict, then combatant 1 or 0, respectively, becomes zero in
some finite time T . Therefore, the extinction time τ is finite and combatant 0 or
1, respectively, wins. If equality holds, the solution lies on the stable manifold
and hence Ij(t) > 0, j = 0, 1 for all t. Therefore the extinction time τ is infinite
and no combatant wins. This finishes the proof.
Restricting the initial state space of Eq. (5) to the unit 1-simplex (∆1), i.e.
I0(0) + I1(0) = 1 we can give a further characterization for the different regions
of the winner, cf. Fig. 2. The regions in ∆1, with combatant i = 0, 1 being the












and the winning regions are given by
W0 =
{
I0 ∈ ∆1 : 1
1 + Γ










Figure 2: The figure depicts a typical example of model (5). Two solutions (dashed black
curves), starting at the 1-simplex ∆1 are plotted. For the solution starting in W1 side 1 is the
winner and for the solution starting in W0 combatant 0 is the winner. The total extinction
line (black solid line) separates the entire phase space I0 × I1. The total extinction point
(black dot) splits the 1-simplex into the two winning regions W0 and W1.
This simple characterization of the solution structure for the two-side Lanchester
model relies on the geometric property that a line separates the plane. Since
a line does not separate the three dimensional space we cannot expect such a
simple characterization for the three-combatant Lanchester model. Anyhow, a
careful inspection of the behavior of solution paths allows at least the formula-
tion of implicit conditions for the characterization of the winning regions. This
analysis will be carried out next.
2.4. Three combatants analysis
We start characterizing the structure of the eigenspaces of Eqs. (1a) to (1c).
Proposition 3. Let
J =
 0 −a01y01 −a02y02−a10y10 0 −a12y12
−a20y20 −a21y21 0
 . (11)
be the Jacobian of the Eqs. (1a) to (1c).
Using the abbreviations
D(J) := −det J = a10 y10 a20 y20 a21 y21 + a01 y01 a02 y02 a12 y12 > 0 (12a)













the eigenvalues ξi, i = 0, 1, 2 of J are given as




± σ1 − σ2
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v0,j = 1, v0 = (v0,1, v0,2, v0,3)
> and v0,j > 0. (14)
A solution I(·) of the Eqs. (1a) to (1c) is given by
I(t) = exp(Jt)I(0), t ≥ 0 (15)
For a detailed proof see Grass et al. (2016)
We already stated that a comparably simple characterization, like the Square
Law, is not be possible for the three-side Lanchester model. In Remark 1 and
Remark 2 we heuristically showed that crossing the total and iso-extinction
curves changes the survivor/winner structure. These curves separate the initial
state space into areas with different survivors and winners. See Fig. 3 where the
various winning regions are shown.
From the arguments given in Remark 1 we see that crossing the total extinc-
tion curve (of the second kind) changes the winner of the model. Following the
arguments in Remark 2 we find that crossing the iso-extinction curve changes
the order of the survivors, while the winner stays the same. Thus, for the
determination of the winner the total extinction curves are of more importance.
Let us now have a closer look at the extinction curves introduced in Defini-
tion 2. To avoid technicalities we restrict ourselves to an intuitive discussion.
For mathematical details we refer to Grass et al. (2016).
Repeating the arguments of Remark 1 and Remark 2 we find the following
procedure to determine the iso- and total-extinction curve (second kind).
A solution I(·) starting at the iso-extinction curve (γ), where two forces are
annihilated at the same time, i.e. I(0) ∈ γ ⊂ ∆ ends at one of the coordinate
axes (ei), (two sides become zero at the same time), i.e. I(T ) ∈ ei, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
A solution I(·) starting at the total extinction curve, i.e. I(0) ∈ ω ⊂ ∆
ends at the stable path (see Remark 3) of the second stage lying in one of
the coordinate planes, i.e. I(T ) ∈ v(i)0 , i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where v
(i)
0 is the stable
eigenvector of the second phase with survivors j, k 6= i.
In both cases the solution ends at a line going through the origin. Such a
line can be written as kx with k ≥ 0 and x ∈ R3. Taking into account that
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: In (a) the winning regions Wi, i = 0, 1, 2 are plotted. These regions are separated
by the total-extinction curves (black). Each region is divided into two subregions W ji , j 6= i,
where j is the second survivor of stage one. These are separated by the iso-extinction curves
(gray). In (b) the surfaces corresponding to the total- and iso-extinction curves are plotted.
These surfaces separate the phase space I0 × I1 × I2 containing the solution paths for the
different regions.
any solution I(·) of the 3-D Lanchester Eqs. (1a) to (1g) is given by I(T ) =
exp(JT )I(0), cf. Eq. (15), the corresponding equations are
exp(JT )I(0) = kx, with k ≥ 0, x ∈ R3, T ≥ 0 (16a)
I0(0) + I1(0) + I2(0) = 1 (16b)
This yields four equations in five unknown variables (I0(0), I1(0), I2(0), k, T ).
Using the implicit function theorem four of the variables can be written as a
(differentiable) function of the fifth variable. With T as the free variable we find
a unique differentiable curve
(c0(T ), c1(T ), c2(T ), k(T ))
>
that solves
exp(JT )(c0(T ), c1(T ), c2(T ))
> = k(T )x, T ≥ 0
c0(T ) + c1(T ) + c2(T ) = 1, T ≥ 0.
From the previous consideration it follows that we have six choices for the vector
x that determine the iso- and total-extinction curves. These are the standard
unit vectors (ei) for the iso-extinction curve and the stable eigenvectors of the
second stage v
(i)
0 for the total extinction curve. Thus we find six curves and a
point in the initial state simplex. We identify the vector v0 with the position
vector and hence the point in the R3 space.
Total-extinction
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point of the first kind ω(1) = {v0}, stable eigenvector of the first stage.
curve of the second kind ω
(2)
i (T ), T ≥ 0 satisfies Eq. (16) for x =
ei, i = 0, 1, 2.
Iso-extinction curve γi(T ), T ≥ 0 satisfies Eq. (16) for x = v(i)0 , i = 0, 1, 2.





{ω(2)i (T ) : T ≥ 0} (17a)




{γi(T ) : T ≥ 0}. (17b)
The extinction curves start at the boundary of the unit 2-simplex (∂∆)
ω
(2)
i (0) = v
(i)
0 and γi(0) = ei, i = 0, 1, 2. (17c)
With increasing T the extinction curves converge to the total-extinction point





i (T ) = lim
T→∞
γi(T ) = ω
(1), i = 0, 1, 2. (17d)
Thus in total these curves separate the initial state space (∆) into six areas with
different survivors and winners. Considering the solution paths for every initial
point lying in the extinction curves we find surfaces that separates the phase
space into six regions.
The winning regions Wi, i = 0, 1, 2 denote those areas, where combatant
i is the winner of model Eq. (1). Taking also the survivors into account, the
winning region W ji , i = 0, 1, 2, j 6= i denotes those areas, where combatants i, j
are survivors and combatant i is the winner of model Eq. (1). See Fig. 3a.
In what follows we will illustrate these curves and surfaces geometrically. In
particular, we will show how they help to solve the central question, namely
which opponent will win the three-sided conflict.
3. Discussion of the numerical solutions
Figure 3 depicts an example for the parameter values y10 = 0.3, y01 = 0.2
and y02 = 0.6 in the first stage. The attrition rates aij , i, j = 0, 1, 2, i 6= j,
are assumed to be one. Together with the complementary values y20, y21 and
y12 the rates sum up to one, meaning that combatant 0 fights with 30% of his
strength against opponent 1 and with 70% of his strength against opponent 2,
and so forth. The magenta, green and olive surfaces are the total extinction
12
surfaces, and the violet, brown and orange areas are the iso-extinction surfaces.
The corresponding curves illustrate the boundaries of the corresponding surface.
As previously explained six different areas can be calculated, which differ
in the winner and/or in the opponent who loses first, see panel Fig. 3a. Not
surprisingly, when the relative size of force Ii, i = 0, 1, 2, is large, this combatant
will come off as winner of the battle. If the initial relative size of combatant
j, j = 0, 1, 2, j 6= i is large compared to opponent 3 − i − j, then combatant j
survives the first stage, but is eliminated in the second.
Fig. 4 provides a sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter a01 for the
symmetric case where yij = 0.5, i, j = 0, 1, 2, which is the attrition rate when
combatant 1 engages opponent 0 (see Eq. (1a)) in the interval [0.01 100]. In the
left panel (a) the area (in relative size) for the three winning regions correspond-
ing to the various values of a01is plotted. The figures on the right (b) and (c)
show the winning regions for the cases a01 = 0.1 and a01 = 100. Obviously, the
chances for combatant 0 to come off as winner are much larger if the intensity of
the attacks from opponent 1 is relatively low, while the chances for combatant
1 to win are bigger when it is able to cause more damage to opponent 0. But
not only combatant 1 profits from a high attack rate, Fig. 4 also clearly shows
the extent to which combatant 2 benefits if opponent 1 starts shooting more
intensely at combatant 0. When a01 increases from 0.01 to 1 the main effect is
that opponent 1 increases its chances to win at the cost of opponent 0’s chances.
But when a01 increases further from 1 to 100, then combatant 2 gains almost
as much as does opponent 1.
Fig. 5 provides a sensitivity analysis for the parameter y10. Suppose that
there are particularly strong animosities between opponents 1 and 2 so that
y12 = y21 = 0.9 and y02 = y01 = 0.1. We assume that all combatants are of
the same strength, i.e. (aij = 1, i,j=0,1,2), but combatant 0 is assumed to have
flexibility over the choice of y10 vs y20. We can distinguish now several scenarios
related to the initial state values considering a range of values for y10 ∈ [0, 1]
(and, hence y20). For the subsequent description cf. Fig. 5a.
Region Wi Combatant i = 0, 1, 2 always wins, no matter how opponent 0
allocates his forces.
Region I Combatant 0 can win, but only if the forces are allocated accordingly,
i.e. the stronger opponent must be primarily fought.
Region K Combatant 0 can be the “king maker” even though its forces are not
able to win. If combatant 0 allocates enough of the forces against opponent
2, combatant 1 wins (Fig. 5b), otherwise opponent 2 wins (Fig. 5c).
In this scenario it is assumed that animosities between opponents 1 and 2 are
so strong, that they basically ignore that combatant 0 can have a substantial
influence on the outcome of the conflict no matter whether combatant 0 is able
to win the conflict or not.
Assume now that combatant 2 sees opponent 1 as his main threat (y12 = 0.9),
while combatant 1 thinks of combatant 0 as his archenemy (y02 = 0.9). Here
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(a) Relative area of winning regions
(b) Winning regions a01 = 0.01
(c) Winning regions a01 = 100
Figure 4: This figure shows a sensitivity analysis carried out for the parameter a01 in the
interval [0.01, 100].
we can analyze how combatant 0 should allocate his forces to be able to win
the conflict. Again we are able to distinguish the regions described above, see
Fig. 6. Due to the severe attacks by opponent 1, the region where combatant
0 can win is significantly smaller than before, however, the region where this
combatant can be “king maker” increases.
It is also noteworthy that the region where opponent 2 always wins is larger
than the region in the scenario above, where opponent 2 focuses on combatant
1. Thus, it is evident that also opponent 1 and 2 could eventually be better
off by a closer consideration regarding which opponent is more dangerous. To
wisely choose the appropriate strategy, however, the opponents need informa-
tion; information about their opponents strength, and information about their
opponents strategy. Yet, this information might not be easily accessible or
deducible. To analyze the impact of information with respect to strategic inter-
actions, one can use (differential) game theory, but this goes beyond the scope
of the present paper.
4. Conclusion
Lanchester’s classic models describe duels where two opponents shoot at
each other with the goal of annihilating the opponent. While Lanchester’s ODE
models have never been extended to more than two players, duels have been
generalized to (so-called) truels already around the middle of the last century;
14
(a) Winning and “king maker” regions
(b) Combatant 1 is the winner
for y10 = 0.33
(c) Combatant 2 is the winner for
y10 = 0.66
Figure 5: This figure shows a sensitivity analysis carried out for the parameter y10 in the
interval [0, 1], the allocation of combatant 0 forces for opponent 1. Combatant 1 and 2 fight
each other with 90% of their forces, i.e. y21 = y12 = 0.9 (symmetric hate).
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(a) Winning and “king maker” regions
(b) Combatant 1 is the winner
for y10 = 0.33
(c) Combatant 2 is the winner for
y10 = 0.66
Figure 6: This figure shows a sensitivity analysis carried out for the parameter y10 in the
interval [0, 1], the allocation of combatant 0 forces for opponent 1. Combatant 2 fights op-
ponent 1 with 90% of its forces; and combatant 1 fights opponent 0 with 90% of its forces
((in)transitive hate).
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see Shubik (1987) and Kilgour and Brams (1997) for an introduction and a
survey of the issue. Essentially, classical truels have a discrete time structure
and include hitting probabilities.
Similar to truels, the purpose of the present paper is to model a three-sided
conflict where the essential question is which combatant (if any) will be able
to win the conflict in the sense of being the only survivor. Unlike a two-sided
combat, each party has to decide how to allocate its forces between the two
opponents. We restrict ourselves to a purely descriptive analysis. While the
model is certainly no tool to predict the outcome of any real conflict, it may
help to better understand the implications of allocation choices in three-sided
conflicts.
In the present paper it has been shown how the Square Law of the two-
dimensional Lanchester model can be extended to three dimensions. While the
three-dimensional model is significantly more complex than the two-dimensional
one, a complete analytical solution of the problem is still possible. While in the
2-D case the stable eigenvector provides the separatrix between the terminal
states, in the present case some surfaces take over such a role. We were able
to locate areas in the state space which differ in the winner of the conflict and
areas which differ in which opponent loses first.
We illustrated how the strength and the allocation choices affect the winner
of a conflict by means of a sensitivity analysis. We saw that in a three-sided
conflict, it is not always a disadvantage if one of the opponents gains strength,
it just depends on which of his opponents this additional strength is mostly
directed. In conflict with a strong animosity between two of the parties, a
third party might – under certain conditions – be able to take advantage of the
situation and determine the outcome of the conflict by its force allocation.
There are many possibilities to extend the model. For example one could
consider the impact of a fourth side. Note, however, that while the transition
from two to three sides involves the additional question of how to allocate one’s
forces, the extension from three to four opponents is straightforward.
An interesting extension would be to consider the linear Lanchester model to
three combatants. Note, however, that in this case it is more difficult to derive
results analytically.
Here it was assumed that the opponents have to allocate all of their troops
between the opponents. If the engagement of troops is costly it might make
sense only to use a certain fraction of the troops for combat.
The presented model is only a first step to understand the impact of force
allocation in a three-opponent combat. The next step to understand optimal
strategies in a combat with three opponents would be to consider allocation rates
which depend on the size of the state variables. This would capture a situation
where the opponents adjust their allocation strategy by means of a feedback
rule to prevent any of the opponents to become too dominant. The obvious
extension then would be to consider the allocation rate as a control variable
and determine when it is optimal to attack each opponent. The possibility of
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